Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) has been around for a while and last year it became an official supported tool by Microsoft (don’t know if my tweaks are though) and there is a lot of articles about implementing LAPS, which is a no brainer and it works great.
Since there are so many articles about it, I would like to share my tweaks. Consider this article more about having fun and exploring the possibilities.
If your new to it and want to read more about LAPS, you can go here: Microsoft Security Advisory 3062591 and here: Security Thoughts: Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS, KB3062591)
And a mini threat model by Jessica Payne: Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) Implementation Hints and Security Nerd Commentary (including mini threat model)
Here’s my view on it. Continue reading →
This is a simple guide delegating DHCP Admins in the domain.
This guide is built on a Windows Server 2012R2 environment.
If you have a lot of DHCP servers and want to delegate the administration in your domain it’s quite easy, and a good thing to do if you don’t want to grant people Domain Admin access unnecessarily. But, there is a few differences you need to know depending on How and Where you install the DHCP Server Role.
If we start with the most common way installing the DHCP Server Role service which is an easy task. Continue reading →
This is an interesting question that I would like to share my view of here.
The question: What are the security implications of someone being able to modify permissions protecting the domain root object?
Let’s start with some basics:
- All Objects in AD are securable
- Securable Objects has a Security Descriptor (SD)
- The SDs contains Owner SID, Group SID, DACL, SACL (known as ACLs) and the header with control flags
- The ACLs contain ACEs
- ACEs contains a set of access rights and a security identifier (SID) that identifies a trustee for whom the rights are allowed, denied, or audited
This topic focuses on the Write_DAC or Modify Permissions. If a Security Principal (User, Sec group, Computer) has the Write_DAC he is allowed to modify the Security Descriptor guarding the object.
So what are the implications of someone having the permission to modify the SD on the Domain Root? Continue reading →
I was browsing thru the new schema updates in Windows Server TP 4 and found an interesting new attribute: ms-DS-Expire-Passwords-On-Smart-Card-Only-Accounts
adminDescription: This attribute controls whether the passwords on smart-card-only accounts expire in accordance with the password policy.
Well, this sound interesting if you read the adminDescription:
This attribute controls whether the passwords on smart-card-only accounts expire in accordance with the password policy.
No much more info when I tried to search the internet.
If we search for the attribute we can find it being used at the root of DNC corp.secid.se Continue reading →
Today Microsoft released new Administrative Templates for Windows 10 Version 201511 which can be found here.
New admx files:
Updated admx files:
A selection of interesting updates:
Continue reading →